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With	  some	  of	  the	  worst	  poverty	  statistics	  in	  Africa,	  Zambia	  appears	  to	  have	  little	  to	  show	  for	  a	  century	  
of	  mining.	  But	  given	  good	  policies,	  the	  country’s	  considerable	  mineral	  wealth	  clearly	  represents	  a	  real	  
opportunity	  to	  grow	  the	  economy	  and	  tackle	  poverty.	  Following	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  mining	  industry	  
since	  privatisation,	  and	  with	  booming	  world	  copper	  prices,	  there	  has	  been	  considerable	  public	  debate	  
over	  how	  to	  ensure	  that	  an	  appropriate	  share	  of	  mineral	  resource	  revenues	  accrues	  to	  the	  government.	  
Debate	  is	  healthy	  and	  should	  lead	  to	  better	  policy,	  but	  only	  if	  it	  is	  well	  informed.	  	  While	  technical	  terms	  
such	  as	  “windfall	  tax”	  are	  frequently	  used	  by	  participants	  in	  the	  debate,	  there	  is	  no	  common	  
understanding	  of	  the	  term.	  The	  full-­‐length	  guide	  upon	  which	  this	  brief	  is	  based	  has	  been	  written	  to	  
address	  this	  information	  gap	  and	  to	  inform	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  debates	  in	  Zambia.	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Objectives	  of	  mineral	  policy	  Mining	  brings	  many	  benefits:	  employment,	  local	  infrastructure,	  linkages	  to	  other	  sectors,	  foreign	  exchange	  earnings,	  and	  government	  revenues.	  But	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these	  –	  the	  one	  that	  all	  Zambians	  share	  in	  –	  is	  tax	  revenues.	  	  Given	  this,	  the	  principal	  objective	  of	  mining	  policy	  should	  be	  to	  maximise	  government	  revenue	  
from	  the	  mining	  sector	  over	  time.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  objective	  –	  “over	  time”	  –	  is	  important.	  It	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  collect	  more	  tax	  today,	  but	  what	  about	  tomorrow?	  If	  mines	  are	  “over-­‐taxed”	  today	  this	  may	  discourage	  future	  exploration,	  investment	  and	  production,	  which	  will	  mean	  lower	  tax	  payments	  in	  future.	  	  Four	  broad	  mineral	  policy	  guidelines	  help	  here:	  1. Compensate	  the	  state	  for	  a	  loss	  of	  subsoil	  
wealth.	  The	  right	  level	  of	  compensation	  for	  each	  unit	  of	  mineral	  extracted	  should	  be	  the	  value	  the	  country	  could	  have	  got	  by	  leaving	  extraction	  for	  another	  day.	  2. Be	  reasonably	  attractive	  to	  investors.	  Subject	  to	  the	  first	  principle,	  the	  tax	  regime	  should	  be	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reasonably	  attractive	  to	  investors,	  given	  the	  other	  investment	  conditions	  in	  the	  country.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  an	  investor	  should	  expect	  a	  reasonable	  return	  from	  risking	  her	  capital	  –	  but	  no	  more	  than	  a	  reasonable	  return.	  	  3. Be	  flexible	  to	  changes	  in	  (true)	  profits.	  The	  tax	  regime	  should	  still	  be	  flexible	  to	  changing	  profitability.	  When	  conditions	  are	  poor,	  the	  tax	  regime	  should	  allow	  mining	  companies	  to	  remain	  in	  business	  –	  subject	  to	  the	  country	  receiving	  sufficient	  compensation	  for	  each	  unit	  of	  the	  extracted	  resource.	  Conversely,	  when	  conditions	  are	  good,	  the	  tax	  regime	  should	  be	  flexible	  enough	  to	  tax	  as	  much	  of	  the	  surplus	  profits	  as	  possible.	  	  4. Be	  administratively	  feasible.	  No	  matter	  how	  well	  a	  tax	  regime	  follows	  the	  first	  three	  principles,	  if	  it	  is	  too	  complex	  for	  the	  tax	  authority	  to	  administer	  mining	  companies	  can	  avoid	  paying	  it.	  The	  tax	  regime	  should	  balance	  the	  need	  to	  follow	  the	  previous	  principles	  with	  the	  need	  to	  minimise	  the	  challenges	  of	  administering	  and	  enforcing	  them.	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3Comparability	  of	  tax	  regimes	  It	  is	  often	  debated	  whether	  mining	  tax	  regimes	  are	  “competitive”	  enough	  to	  attract	  investment.	  But	  comparing	  different	  tax	  regimes	  is	  not	  straightforward.	  For	  one	  thing,	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  there	  are	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  opportunities	  for	  firms	  to	  exploit	  mineral	  deposits.	  This	  limits	  the	  degree	  of	  choice	  over	  where	  to	  invest.	  For	  another,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  level	  of	  tax	  rates,	  the	  predictability	  of	  tax	  rates	  (and	  any	  other	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  regulatory,	  legislative	  and	  contractual	  systems)	  is	  very	  important	  for	  investors.	  Investors	  need	  to	  know	  what	  tax	  rates	  they	  will	  face	  when	  forecasting	  profits.	  If	  the	  tax	  regime	  is	  unstable,	  this	  will	  make	  forecasting	  difficult.	  Finally,	  a	  competitive	  tax	  regime	  will	  not	  attract	  investment	  if	  other	  investment	  criteria	  are	  neglected.	  In	  Zambia,	  non-­‐tax	  factors	  may	  be	  more	  significant	  than	  tax	  in	  investment	  decisions:	  lack	  of	  skills,	  opaque	  regulation,	  and	  infrastructural	  bottlenecks.	  	  
Zambia’s	  mining	  tax	  regimes	  Since	  the	  privatisation	  of	  Zambia’s	  mining	  industry,	  four	  tax	  regimes	  have	  applied	  (also	  see	  Table	  1):	  1. The	  Development	  Agreements	  negotiated	  with	  individual	  mines	  at	  privatisation	  2. The	  “2008	  regime”	  (April	  2008	  to	  March	  2009)	  3. The	  “2009	  regime”	  (April	  2009	  to	  March	  2012)	  4. The	  “2012	  regime”	  (since	  April	  2012).	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Development	  Agreements	  were	  made	  between	  the	  Zambian	  government	  and	  each	  company.	  These	  have	  never	  been	  made	  publicly	  available	  by	  the	  Zambian	  government.	  Leaked	  documents	  show	  that	  the	  tax	  rates	  and	  other	  details	  for	  each	  company	  differed.	  In	  2003	  it	  was	  agreed	  that	  all	  mining	  companies	  operating	  former	  ZCCM	  assets	  would	  pay	  the	  same	  rates	  for	  company	  income	  tax	  and	  mineral	  royalty.	  The	  details	  in	  Table	  1	  relate	  to	  the	  tax	  regime	  that	  mining	  companies	  faced	  after	  2003.	  The	  agreements	  represented	  a	  stable	  tax	  burden	  that	  arguably	  encouraged	  investment,	  but	  one	  which	  was	  below	  the	  global	  average.	  With	  mining	  tax	  revenues	  failing	  to	  rise	  in	  line	  with	  copper	  prices	  and	  production,	  tax	  reforms	  were	  introduced	  in	  2008.	  The	  fiscal	  stability	  clauses	  in	  the	  Development	  Agreements	  were	  ended	  and	  the	  Windfall	  Tax	  introduced.	  	  The	  Windfall	  Tax	  was	  criticised	  for	  being	  too	  onerous,	  compounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  due	  to	  a	  technical	  error	  in	  its	  design,	  windfall	  tax	  payments	  could	  not	  be	  deducted	  from	  profits	  for	  income	  tax	  purposes,	  which	  could	  have	  increased	  the	  overall	  tax	  burden	  to	  an	  unacceptably	  high	  level.	  Imposing	  tax	  reforms	  that	  increased	  the	  tax	  burden	  on	  the	  mining	  companies	  which	  held	  Development	  Agreements	  was	  illegal	  and	  gave	  the	  mining	  companies	  the	  right	  to	  seek	  financial	  damages.	  Ultimately,	  no	  case	  was	  actually	  taken	  to	  arbitration	  by	  the	  industry,	  but	  the	  government’s	  actions	  did	  shake	  investor	  confidence	  in	  Zambia.	  
Table	  1.	  Details	  of	  the	  four	  post-­‐privatisation	  tax	  regimes	  
	   DA	   2008	   2009	   2012	  
PROFIT-­‐BASED	  TAXES	   	  
Company	  Income	  Tax	  rate	  	   25%	   30%	   30%	   30%	  
Variable	  Profit	  Tax	  in	  effect?	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Profit	  tax	  base	  details	   	  
Capital	  Depreciation	  Allowance	   100%	   25%	   100%	   100%	  
Loss	  carry	  forward	  (max.	  years)	   15	  to	  20	  years	  	   10	  years	   10	  years	   10	  years	  
Allowed	  Debt	  to	  Equity	  ratio	   2:1	   3:1	   2:1	   2:1	  
REVENUE-­‐BASED	  TAXES	   	  
Mineral	  Royalty	   0.6%	   3%	   3%	   6%	  
Windfall	  Tax	   No	   Yes	   No	   No	  
OTHER	  TAX	  TYPES	   	  
Customs	  Duty	   Exempt	  in	  most	  cases	   Customs	  apply,	  but	  rebate,	  refund	  or	  remission	  of	  the	  duty	  
payable	  in	  respect	  of	  plant,	  machinery,	  or	  equipment.	  
Export	  duty	  (on	  copper	  anodes)	   No	   15%	  (but	  with	  some	  
waivers)	  
15%	  (but	  with	  
some	  waivers)	  
10%	  (but	  with	  some	  
waivers)	  
Withholding	  profit	  tax	   0%	   15%	  on	  services,	  0%	  on	  other	  payments	  
	  A	  brief	  guide	  to	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  tax	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Here	  we	  look	  briefly	  at	  some	  of	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  taxation	  applied	  to	  the	  mining	  sector	  around	  the	  world.	  
Taxes	  are	  either	  direct	  or	  indirect	  (see	  figure	  below),	  and	  only	  the	  direct	  ones	  are	  described	  below.	  	  
DIRECT	  TAXES	   INDIRECT	  TAXES	  
Profit-­‐based	   Revenue-­‐based	   	   	  
Company	  income	  
tax	  






VAT	   Customs	  and	  
import	  duty	  
Corporate	  income	  tax	  
Company	  income	  tax	  is	  usually	  applied	  to	  all	  businesses,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  complex	  tax.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  taxable	  profits	  
which	  the	  base	  on	  which	  the	  tax	  rate	  is	  applied	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  numerous	  ways	  with	  many	  additional	  provisions	  
that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  alter	  the	  amount	  of	  tax	  that	  is	  payable.	  	  
Excess	  (or	  variable)	  profits	  tax	  
Such	  taxes	  are	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  “resource	  rent	  tax”	  –	  a	  tax	  designed	  to	  extract	  the	  maximum	  possible	  
revenue	  from	  a	  mining	  company	  without	  damaging	  the	  incentives	  for	  investors,	  thus	  preserving	  the	  long-­‐term	  
viability	  of	  the	  industry.	  They	  have	  at	  least	  two	  advantages.	  First,	  they	  do	  not	  significantly	  affect	  the	  incentive	  to	  
invest.	  Second,	  they	  are	  widely	  perceived	  by	  the	  public	  as	  being	  “fair”	  as	  they	  extract	  a	  share	  of	  exceptionally	  
high	  profits.	  	  
Mineral	  royalties	  
Mineral	  royalties	  –	  levied	  as	  a	  fixed	  percentage	  of	  the	  value	  of	  a	  company’s	  sales	  of	  a	  particular	  mineral	  –	  have	  
three	  main	  advantages	  for	  governments.	  First,	  since	  they	  are	  charged	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  mineral	  extracted,	  they	  
are	  well	  suited	  as	  a	  charge	  for	  compensating	  the	  resource	  owner	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  wealth	  as	  a	  result	  of	  extraction.	  
Second,	  royalties	  are	  a	  more	  reliable	  revenue	  source	  than	  profit-­‐based	  taxes,	  as	  some	  revenue	  will	  be	  collected	  
as	  soon	  as	  production	  commences.	  Third,	  royalties	  are	  relatively	  easy	  to	  administer	  because	  usually	  the	  only	  
information	  required	  is	  the	  sales	  volume	  of	  the	  mineral	  and	  the	  unit	  price.	  	  
Windfall	  tax	  (variable	  rate	  royalty)	  
A	  variable	  rate	  royalty	  can	  be	  a	  useful	  tax	  instrument	  that	  provides	  some	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  a	  standard	  fixed	  
rate	  royalty	  while	  avoiding	  some	  of	  the	  disadvantages.	  To	  avoid	  a	  regressive	  tax	  regime,	  it	  is	  a	  good	  idea	  to	  have	  a	  
low	  royalty	  rate	  and	  levy	  a	  profit-­‐based	  tax.	  However,	  if	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  tax	  authority	  for	  levying	  profit-­‐based	  
taxes	  is	  low,	  alternative	  solution	  is	  to	  use	  a	  royalty	  whose	  rate	  varies	  according	  to	  the	  market	  price	  of	  the	  
mineral.	  With	  such	  a	  rule,	  a	  variable-­‐rate	  royalty	  can	  be	  made	  to	  be	  less	  regressive	  than	  a	  fixed-­‐rate	  royalty:	  if	  the	  
price	  falls,	  the	  royalty	  rate	  also	  falls;	  conversely,	  when	  prices	  rise,	  the	  royalty	  rate	  rises.	  As	  the	  base	  is	  still	  
revenue,	  rather	  than	  costs,	  a	  variable	  rate	  royalty	  still	  shares	  other	  characteristics	  with	  a	  fixed-­‐rate	  royalty.	  On	  
the	  plus	  side	  it	  is	  comparatively	  easy	  to	  administer.	  However,	  it	  is	  still	  not	  as	  progressive	  as	  a	  profit-­‐based	  tax.	  
Adjustments	  to	  the	  tax	  base	  
Tax	  regimes	  often	  include	  measures	  to	  fine-­‐tune	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  tax	  regime	  to	  meet	  certain	  objectives.	  
Four	  types	  are	  explained	  in	  the	  full-­‐length	  version	  of	  this	  guide:	  depreciation	  allowances;	  loss	  carry-­‐forward	  
provisions;	  ring-­‐fencing;	  and	  tax	  holidays.	  
Fiscal	  stability	  contracts	  
Fiscal	  stability	  clauses	  are	  agreements	  by	  the	  host	  government	  not	  to	  increase	  the	  tax	  burden	  for	  participating	  
mining	  companies	  over	  a	  period	  of	  years.	  They	  are	  a	  way	  to	  balance	  investors’	  need	  for	  predictability	  in	  the	  
amount	  of	  tax	  they	  will	  pay	  with	  governments’	  freedom	  to	  adjust	  tax	  policy	  over	  time.	  	  Some	  options	  for	  doing	  
this	  are	  presented	  in	  full-­‐length	  guide.	  	  
The	  full-­‐length	  guide	  also	  explains	  some	  key	  problems	  for	  tax	  administrators	  to	  deal	  with:	  transfer	  pricing	  abuse;	  
the	  reported	  value	  of	  production;	  debt	  payments;	  and	  hedging.	  
	  
Notes:	  For	  full	  references	  and	  sources	  refer	  to	  the	  full-­‐length	  paper:	  A	  guide	  to	  mining	  tax	  in	  Zambia	  by	  
David	  Manley	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The	  2008	  regime	  lasted	  only	  a	  year.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  falling	  copper	  prices	  and	  mines	  refusing	  to	  pay	  the	  taxes,	  the	  tax	  regime	  was	  reformed	  in	  2009.	  Windfall	  tax	  was	  abolished	  and	  other	  provisions	  were	  reversed.	  	  Following	  general	  elections	  in	  September	  2011	  and	  the	  resulting	  change	  of	  government,	  further	  reforms	  were	  made	  to	  the	  mining	  tax	  regime	  in	  the	  
2012	  Budget.	  The	  headline	  change	  was	  an	  increase	  in	  mineral	  royalties	  to	  6%.	  	  
Comments	  on	  the	  2012	  regime	  Table	  2	  shows	  that	  from	  privatisation	  in	  2000	  until	  2005	  tax	  and	  royalty	  revenues	  from	  mining	  companies	  were	  particularly	  poor.	  Since	  2005,	  revenues	  have	  grown	  considerably.	  There	  are	  five	  principle	  drivers	  that	  could	  explain	  this:	  1. Rise	  in	  copper	  and	  cobalt	  prices	  2. Rise	  in	  production	  3. Depletion	  of	  mining	  companies’	  loss	  carry	  forward	  provisions	  	  4. Increase	  in	  tax	  rates	  5. Smaller	  tax	  gap	  from	  better	  tax	  administration	  procedures	  and	  better	  tax	  instruments.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  recent	  rise	  in	  tax	  revenues	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  result	  of	  the	  tax	  regime’s	  performance.	  Revenue	  statistics	  cannot	  tell	  us	  how	  well	  the	  tax	  regime	  has	  performed	  against	  the	  objective	  of	  capturing	  the	  maximum	  value	  of	  the	  extracted	  mineral	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  Even	  though	  revenues	  have	  increased	  significantly,	  this	  has	  been	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  depleting	  close	  to	  5.6	  million	  tonnes	  of	  Zambia	  copper	  reserves.	  The	  question	  to	  ask	  is:	  has	  Zambia	  been	  sufficiently	  compensated	  for	  this	  depletion?	  The	  answer	  requires	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  than	  can	  be	  provided	  in	  this	  guide,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	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at	  least	  be	  aware	  of	  this	  question	  when	  reporting	  on	  revenue	  performances	  in	  the	  mining	  sector.	  No	  estimate	  of	  the	  Average	  Effective	  Tax	  Rate	  for	  Zambia’s	  current	  mining	  tax	  regime	  has	  been	  undertaken,	  but	  it	  is	  probably	  close	  to	  the	  upper	  end	  of	  the	  normal	  range	  for	  mineral	  tax	  regimes	  (40–50%).	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  non-­‐tax	  problems	  have	  a	  more	  significant	  effect	  on	  Zambia’s	  attractiveness	  to	  investors.	  	  The	  2012	  regime	  is	  less	  flexible	  than	  the	  2009	  one	  owing	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  royalty	  rate,	  which	  could	  pose	  problems	  for	  mines’	  commercial	  viability	  in	  the	  vent	  of	  falling	  copper	  prices.	  A	  variable	  rate	  royalty	  should	  be	  considered	  to	  address	  this.	  	  The	  need	  for	  flexibility	  must	  also	  be	  balanced	  with	  the	  need	  for	  stability.	  	  The	  current	  tax	  regime	  provides	  no	  contracted	  or	  legislated	  stability	  clauses.	  While	  such	  assurances	  are	  not	  needed	  for	  large	  mining	  companies	  already	  in	  Zambia,	  stability	  periods	  could	  be	  considered	  specifically	  for	  attracting	  new	  investment.	  The	  feasibility	  of	  the	  tax	  system	  is	  a	  function	  of	  both	  the	  design	  of	  the	  tax	  types	  used	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  tax	  authority.	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  Zambia	  Revenue	  Authority	  has	  made	  efforts	  to	  improve	  mining	  tax	  administration.	  The	  2012	  reform	  to	  separate	  hedging	  income	  from	  other	  mining	  income	  is	  also	  designed	  to	  reduce	  the	  burden	  of	  administration.	  However	  there	  is	  still	  work	  to	  be	  done	  to	  improve	  the	  administrative	  details	  of	  Zambia’s	  tax	  regime.	  
Table	  2.	  Direct	  tax	  revenue	  from	  the	  mining	  industry,	  2000–2011	  
	  
2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	  
Company	  tax	   2	   2	   1	   0	   0	   1	   160	   603	   464	   401	   1,244	   2,632	  
Withholding	  tax	   0	   -­‐	   -­‐	   1	   2	   3	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   	   	  
Mineral	  royalty	   4	   7	   3	   8	   4	   39	   59	   68	   238	   235	   412	   891	  
Export	  duty	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   178	   15	   	   	  
Windfall	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   126	   -­‐	   	   	  
Total	   5	   9	   3	   9	   6	   43	   219	   670	   1,006	   651	   1,656	   3,524	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